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ARGUMENTS IN favor of privatization pose what are referred to here as Rainey’s conundrum (2003). Rain-
ey notes that one of the key rationales offered 
for privatization is that the public sector is 
poorly managed. Ironically, however, success-
ful privatization requires outstanding public-
sector management. In particular, the move 
from a centralized command-and-control style 
bureaucratic structure to contract-based pro-
gram delivery demands a sophisticated set of 
managerial skills and structural changes that 
would challenge the most effi cient and effec-
tive organization regardless of sector affi lia-
tion (Cooper 2003). 
The managerial requirements of privati-
zation for midlevel managers—the focus of 
this article—are particularly signifi cant. With 
respect to contracting out, managers can be 
involved in preparing requests for propos-
als, reviewing submitted proposals, provid-
ing input into contracting decisions, crafting 
contract language, and ushering contracts 
through internal approval processes (Seiden-
stat 1999, 240; Rusten 1999, 190). Once con-
tracts have been signed, midlevel managers 
may be the primary overseers of contractors, 
providing direction, monitoring contractual 
tasks, and ensuring compliance with contract 
terms (Seidenstat 1999, 240). While not a 
technical step in contracting out, building 
relationships with contractors is a necessary 
step toward facilitating effective alternative 
service delivery (Cooper 2003, 101). 
Despite their signifi cant contribution to 
privatization processes, midlevel manag-
ers have largely been ignored in studies of 
privatization’s stakeholders. Rather, more at-
tention has been devoted to the privatization 
responses of citizens, political leaders, city 
managers, and state agency directors. Studies 
examining citizen attitudes toward privatiza-
tion have argued the importance of public 
opinion to political support for privatization 
and the strategic value of such information 
(Durant and Legge 2002; Thompson and El-
ling 2000). The attitudes of state legislators 
toward contracting out have been justifi ed 
by the importance of legislative support to 
administrators in designing alternative ser-
vice-delivery systems (Becker and Mackel-
prang 1990). Studies of city managers have 
focused on the relationship between their 
government reform values and the level of 
reform activity in their cities (Moon and de-
Leon 2001), as well as the number of reform 
recommendations they make to city councils 
(Kearney, Feldman, and Scavo 2000; Kearney 
and Scavo 2001). Finally, state-level reinven-
tion efforts have been studied as a function of 
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state agency directors’ commitment to cus-
tomer service and organizational leadership 
(Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 1999).
Taken together, these studies suggest that 
(1) the attitudes of privatization’s stakehold-
ers matter to the success of implementation 
efforts and (2) understanding the factors driv-
ing stakeholder attitudes may yield informa-
tion that can be strategically used to improve 
those attitudes. Public managers, one sort of 
stakeholder, may perceive privatization ini-
tiatives as detrimental to themselves or the 
agencies for which they work. Accordingly, 
these managers may fail to adjust to priva-
tization, potentially leading to lower morale 
and higher turnover (Kettl 1993, 59), a de-
cline in public service ethics (Haque 1996), 
or sabotage of privatization processes (Pres-
ident’s Commission on Privatization 1988, 
136). Alternatively, positive perceptions of 
privatization may facilitate more successful 
privatization efforts (Savas 2000). These as-
sertions assume a bottom-up perspective on 
program implementation, one that assigns 
signifi cant power to the employees in charge 
of executing public initiatives (Lipsky 1980; 
Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003). 
With these rationales in mind, this study 
examines individual characteristics associ-
ated with managerial perceptions of priva-
tization. The managerial characteristics of 
interest include professional identity, beliefs 
about privatization’s impacts on profession-
al self-interest, and relationships between 
public managers and contractors. Borrowing 
from theories of bureaucratic behavior, public 
choice, and regulatory capture, professional 
identity is expected to be associated with 
more negative perceptions toward privatiza-
tion, whereas stronger relationships between 
managers and contractors and beliefs about 
privatization’s professional benefi ts should 
be associated with more favorable percep-
tions. In addition to testing the utility of the 
bureaucratic behavior theories in which these 
hypotheses are grounded, examining the rela-
tionship between these attributes and mana-
gerial perceptions of privatization provides 
practical knowledge of the factors that can be 
manipulated to improve managerial receptiv-
ity to privatization. 
Mail survey results from a sample of man-
agers within the Georgia Department of 
Transportation provide the study data. Re-
spondents are engineers and other managers 
in the agency whose work has been subject to 
signifi cant contract competition. The agency’s 
primary privatization mechanism is contract-
ing out, the most common form of privati-
zation, which involves hiring private-sector 
fi rms to provide services (GAO 1997). The 
pace of privatization has been quite rapid: in 
1997, the agency contracted out 10 percent 
of the engineering design work. Currently, 
50 percent of this work is performed through 
contracts. 
Literature Review and Hypotheses
To begin with, a manager’s professional iden-
tity may infl uence perceptions of privatiza-
tion. While defi nitions of professionalism 
vary widely (Schott 1976), they tend to fo-
cus on specialized education, autonomy, clear 
boundaries within which professionals have 
exclusive prerogative to operate, and differ-
entiation of professional fi elds from nonpro-
fessionalized work (Mosher 1982; Goode 
1969). Professional identity is defi ned here 
as an individual’s psychological orientation 
as a professional, an assertion consistent with 
the contention that professionalism is partly 
a matter of self-concept (Edwards, Nalban-
dian, and Wedel 1981; Hall 1968). Privati-
zation may contradict professional identity 
by requiring professionals to interact inter-
dependently with contractors, blurring the 
boundaries within which agency profession-
als operate, and displacing professional tasks 
with managerial ones. In support of the latter 
point, privatization sometimes shifts public 
employees’ daily tasks from work for which 
they have been trained to contract monitor-
ing and compliance, for which they have 
not been trained (Kettl 1993). Bureaucratic 
tasks generally have been shown to alienate 
230
DeHart-Davis and Kingsley
State and Local Government Review
professionals more so than nonprofessionals, 
presumably by limiting participation in core 
organizational tasks and curtailing profes-
sional autonomy (Greene 1978; Miller 1967). 
Accordingly, it is expected that
Hypothesis 1: Agency managers with 
stronger professional identity will perceive 
privatization more negatively than those 
with weaker professional identities.
Singer (2003) notes a similar phenomenon 
when militaries contract with private fi rms 
for a variety of services (including merce-
nary ones). The U.S. military in particular 
engenders a very specifi c form of professional 
identity and culture that may be violated by 
interactions with private-sector contractors. 
These tensions have also been noted between 
the U.S. military and American contractors 
currently serving in Iraq (National Public 
Radio 2005). 
A contrasting point of view comes from 
the public choice perspective, which suggests 
that managers perceive privatization favor-
ably because of its positive impacts on their 
professional self-interest. This approach as-
sumes that bureaucrats “evaluate and support, 
undermine or nullify reform proposals on the 
basis of what new rules imply for their inter-
est” (Wade 1979, 350). The traditional public 
choice approach argues that bureaucratic self-
interest is refl ected by larger budgets, which 
are assumed to secure political survival, higher 
salaries, perquisites, and power (Breton 1974; 
Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Buchanan 1977; 
Niskanen 1971). Thus, public servants might 
be expected to resist privatization because of 
its potential to slow expansion of the public 
sector, limit personal infl uence and the size 
of public budgets, lower public spending, and 
expand the role of market forces (Dunleavy 
1992; Wise and Szucs 1996). 
Other public choice theorists have raised 
the possibility that budget minimization may 
advance bureaucratic self-interest by enabling 
professional advancement (Wade 1979; Bret-
on and Wintrobe 1975; Sigelman 1986). Giv-
en the political popularity of privatization ini-
tiatives among elected offi cials (Johnston and 
Romzek 1999), the potential cost savings ac-
companying privatization (real or perceived) 
may lead upper-level public managers to sup-
port privatization as a way to curry political 
favor. Cost savings may also incur fi nancial 
rewards for public managers, as illustrated by 
county department heads who were awarded 
bonuses for outstanding management, in part 
based on the extent to which they had en-
gaged in contracting out (Rusten 1999, 190). 
Ruhil et al. (1999) suggest that city managers 
gain reputational benefi ts from implementing 
successful government reforms, which in turn 
enables them to secure higher-paying posi-
tions in the national market. 
For middle managers, privatization may 
alter daily tasks and thus the basis on which 
managerial performance is evaluated. Specifi -
cally, increased privatization calls for public 
managers to develop new skill sets, such as 
negotiating, monitoring, and managing con-
tracts (Peters 1993; Kettl 1993; 2002). Con-
sequently, it is reasonable to expect that man-
agers will incur organizational rewards (e.g., 
higher pay and faster promotion) for compe-
tently executing these new duties (Savas 2000, 
297). While empirical data on privatization’s 
career benefi ts for middle managers are lack-
ing, public choice theory provides a clear basis 
for expecting that agency managers evaluate 
privatization based on their expectations for 
its impacts on their self-interest. Accordingly 
it is expected that 
Hypothesis 2: Agency managers who be-
lieve that managing contractors will lead 
to professional advancement will perceive 
privatization more positively than those 
who do not hold such perceptions.
In addition to supporting a public choice 
explanation of managerial perceptions of 
privatization (albeit one that alters traditional 
notions of the conditions leading to bureau-
cratic self-interest), a confi rming result for 
the hypothesis may illuminate, in part, how 
adaptation to privatization occurs: by reward-
ing behavior that facilitates privatization.
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The extent of an agency manager’s expo-
sure to contractors may also infl uence percep-
tions of privatization via relational distance, 
defi ned as the degree to which people par-
ticipate in one another’s lives (Black 1976). A 
concept used by regulatory capture theorists, 
short relational distance is assumed to lead 
regulators to identify with regulated entities 
and lose their sense of organizational differ-
entiation (Hood et al. 1999). Such familiarity 
compromises the independent judgment of 
regulators in regard to evaluating regulated 
communities, thereby biasing information 
about performance (Ashworth, Boyne, and 
Walker 2002). 
Two dimensions of relational distance are 
frequency of contact and duration of relation-
ships between parties. Scholars have detected 
the effects of frequent contact and long-term 
relationships on law enforcement behavior, 
including more favorable perceptions of the 
compliance motivations of regulated entities 
(Hood et al. 1999), a lower likelihood of pur-
suing punitive action by regulators (Grabosky 
and Braithwaite 1986), and higher incidences 
of police corruption (Simpson 1977). While 
these impacts are distinct from those that may 
arise from short relational distances between 
agency managers and contractors, they all 
share the common effect of triggering the 
regulator’s positive identifi cation with the 
regulated. This evidence leads to two hy-
potheses:
Hypothesis 3: Agency managers who are 
in more frequent contact with contractors 
outside the agency setting will perceive 
privatization more favorably than those 
who are in less frequent contact with con-
tractors.
Hypothesis 4: Agency managers with 
more years of experience working with 
contractors will perceive privatization 
more favorably than those with less such 
experience.
A third dimension of relational distance 
is the degree of shared experiences that arise 
when regulators have worked previously in 
the industries of the regulated. When regula-
tors share professional backgrounds with the 
regulated, they tend to perceive more posi-
tive compliance motives for regulated entities 
(Hood et al. 1999) and to be less rule-bound 
and prosecutorial in their interactions with 
the regulated (Hood et al. 1999; Grabosky 
and Braithwaite 1986). Extrapolating this link 
between regulators’ experiences and percep-
tions of the regulated to agency managers and 
their contractors, it is expected that 
Hypothesis 5: Agency managers with prior 
private-sector experience will perceive 
privatization more favorably than those 
with no such prior experience. 
Perhaps the strongest indicator of relational 
distance, not directly tested in the literature, 
is the quality of relationships between regula-
tors and the regulated. From this perspective, 
managers may build positive interpersonal re-
lationships with contractors that cause them 
to perceive privatization in a more positive 
light. Thus the expectation is that 
Hypothesis 6: Agency managers report-
ing positive relationships with contractors 
will perceive privatization more favorably 
than those reporting less positive contrac-
tor relationships.
The relational distance hypotheses (Hypoth-
eses 3–6) assume that stronger relationships 
between managers and contractors (defi ned 
by quantity and quality of interactions) lead 
to more favorable managerial perceptions of 
privatization. 
Context for the Study
This study, based on observations of the Geor-
gia Department of Transportation (GDOT), 
began in 2001. The complete study is ongoing 
and designed to examine the agency’s “consul-
tant” management strategies.1 The project’s 
data collection methods include case studies 
of GDOT projects, case studies of other state 
DOTs’ consultant management practices, ex-
tensive semistructured interviews with man-
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agers from the agency and the contracting 
organizations, a review of the transportation 
literature, and a survey of midlevel managers. 
This section provides the context for the sur-
vey research gleaned through interviews, the 
case studies, and the literature review. 
State transportation agencies historically 
have outsourced transportation system con-
struction. However, over the last decade, 
state transportation agencies have come un-
der increasing pressure to outsource other 
activities such as maintenance, information 
systems, entire road and port systems, and 
other administrative activities (Ellis, Guertin, 
and Shannon 2000; Witheford 1997; 1999). 
However, many state agencies have been re-
luctant to outsource engineering design work 
because it is a key point of quality control 
in the development of public infrastructure 
(Cochran et al. 2004). In any given trans-
portation project, roughly 90 percent of the 
budget will go to construction and roughly 
10 percent to engineering design (also called 
preconstruction). 
Historically, design engineers have consti-
tuted the cultural heart of state DOTs. Entry-
level professional training is in civil engineer-
ing. Agency leaders typically work their way 
up by spending a portion of their career in 
the various engineering design departments. 
While the number of individuals involved in 
engineering design is relatively small (typi-
cally 10 percent or less of most state DOTs), 
over time they provide a talent pool of mana-
gerial leadership for the agency.
This study focuses on the contracting out 
of engineering design and inspection ser-
vices that have traditionally been conducted 
in-house. One of the interesting aspects of 
GDOT’s experience with privatization is that 
the decision to contract out did not come 
from a top-down political directive. While 
the State of Georgia has a history of several 
governors strongly promoting privatization 
as state policy, GDOT has remained largely 
immune from such pressure. 
Several factors have created the conditions 
for privatization:
• Expansion of Public Transportation 
Programs—Under the last several gov-
ernors, the state has sought to improve 
or increase highways and roads, result-
ing in a sharp increase in the number of 
projects being initiated under the State 
Transportation Implementation Plan.
• Public Finance Rules—The rules gov-
erning public bonds issued by the state 
to fi nance specifi c classes of transporta-
tion projects have changed and no lon-
ger permit the addition of state person-
nel, thereby limiting GDOT’s ability to 
use state personnel on many projects. 
• Downsizing of Workforce—The com-
pletion of the interstate highway system 
and changing public attitudes toward 
governmental functions and use of tax 
dollars have led GDOT, as well as other 
DOTs, to downsize their workforce. To 
illustrate, GDOT went from roughly 
10,000 employees in the 1960s and early 
1970s to fewer than 6,000 employees in 
2005. Attrition, reductions in force, and 
the elimination of vacant positions have 
become the norm rather than the excep-
tion among transportation agencies. 
• Retirements—GDOT, like many agen-
cies, is in the midst of a wave of retire-
ments from the public service. These 
retirements are creating a personnel 
void that cannot be adequately fi lled 
due to restrictions created by public 
fi nance rules. 
• Changing Civil Service Rules—Geor-
gia recently eliminated the merit sys-
tem governing civil service employees. 
Also eliminated were revolving-door 
rules preventing public offi cials from 
going to work for the private-sector 
fi rms with whom they interacted in 
their previous positions. The lifting 
of this constraint has led employees to 
retire from GDOT then go to work for 
higher-paying GDOT consultants. 
Under these circumstances, many GDOT 
managers felt coerced to hire consultants. 
233Vol. 37, No. 3, 2005
Managerial Perceptions of Privatization
One of the fi ndings from semistructured 
interviews with senior GDOT leadership 
is that the increased use of contractors is a 
second-best solution stemming from these 
constraints in their working environment. 
The initial attempt to cope with this situa-
tion was to create an Offi ce of Consultant 
Design (OCD), which was supposed to be the 
unit that managed all projects hiring consul-
tants. OCD was to act as a buffer and bound-
ary-spanning unit shielding the other design 
engineers from the distraction of contract 
management. The quick expansion of the 
transportation program soon overwhelmed 
all efforts to buffer, however. The result 
has been large numbers of design engineers 
wearing two hats: one for producing the en-
gineering design and the other for overseeing 
contractors performing the work. 
This study focuses on the perceptions of 
GDOT managers regarding the impacts of 
consultant usage on the agency and them-
selves. To summarize, managers have de-
veloped these perceptions in the contexts 
of rapid expansion of the GDOT program, 
severe constraints on personnel availability, 
professional service contracts in which the 
focus is less on cost control and more on 
quality assurance, unsuccessful efforts to con-
tain consultant management to a single unit 
(OCD), and expansion of the day-to-day tasks 
of engineering professionals to include both 
creating engineering designs (a desired activ-
ity because it utilizes their professional train-
ing) and managing the work of consultants (a 
less desired activity because it is perceived as 
bureaucratic and nonprofessional). 
Data
Data were collected through a mail survey 
questionnaire of GDOT project managers. 
Survey content was based on input collected 
in 17 semistructured interviews with midlevel 
and senior agency managers between April 
2002 and July 2003. Twelve case studies of 
consultant projects gathered between Octo-
ber 2002 and March 2003 informed parts of 
the survey not directly related to managerial 
perceptions of privatization. A draft survey 
was pretested in person with three key in-
formants, two current employees, and one 
former employee. Feedback during these in-
terviews served to refi ne question design and 
survey format: questions were added, concepts 
were clarifi ed, and language was made consis-
tent. The fi nal survey comprised 16 pages, 33 
questions, and nearly 300 individual items. 
The sampling frame was developed by 
telephoning, e-mailing, and faxing all offi ce 
heads within the agency to request contact 
information (including telephone numbers 
and mailing addresses) for employees work-
ing with consultants. Some offi ces reported 
no employees working with consultants, while 
one offi ce provided contact information for 
25 employees interacting with consultants. 
This effort yielded 286 employees from 8 di-
visions, 41 offi ces, and 7 districts. Employees 
ranged from project managers to administra-
tive personnel to division heads.
The text of all survey materials stressed 
that participation was voluntary and that 
individual results and survey participation 
would be kept confi dential. Survey materials 
also emphasized the agency’s desire to better 
understand the issues and challenges of in-
creased consultant usage from the perspective 
of its most affected personnel. To communi-
cate the independent nature of the study, all 
survey materials were returned directly to the 
research team.  
The survey process yielded 231 returned 
and completed questionnaires, representing 
an 81 percent response rate. The percentage 
of mail surveys received is proportional to 
the percentage distributed to agency offi ces, 
suggesting a sample highly representative of 
managers working with consultants across the 
organization. As for the substantive composi-
tion of managers in the sample, 65 percent had 
exclusively performed engineering-related 
tasks, including construction oversight, design 
engineering, and construction or preconstruc-
tion project management. Only 8 percent of 
managers in the sample had exclusively per-
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formed work in areas not represented by tra-
ditional engineering processes, such as legal 
counsel, auditing, planning, and accounting. 
Nineteen percent had performed both core 
and support roles, while 9 percent had per-
formed tasks outside these categories.
Measures
This section describes the measures used in 
the two models of managerial perceptions of 
privatization. The dependent variable in the 
fi rst model is the perceived impacts of priva-
tization on the state transportation agency. 
The dependent variable in the second mod-
el is the perceived impacts of privatization 
on the respondent as an agency employee. 
The same explanatory variables are used in 
both models: three individual measures of 
professional identity, a scale measuring the 
perceived career benefi ts of privatization (or 
professional self-interest), and six individu-
al measures of relational distance. Control 
variables include gender, education, agency 
tenure, and the percentage of a respondent’s 
projects involving consultants.
A scale, adapted from Kakabadse and Kak-
abadse (2001), measures aggregate percep-
tions of privatization’s effects on the agency. 
The scale sums a manager’s assessments (rang-
ing from 1 to 5) of 14 potential impacts of 
consultant usage on the agency. The impacts 
pertain to cost, effectiveness, administrative 
fl exibility, reputation, agency capacity, em-
ployee motivation, accountability, and output 
quality. The lowest possible score is 14, and 
the highest possible score is 70. Higher scores 
refl ect more positive agency impacts (e.g., 
lower cost, improved agency reputation) and 
vice versa. Cronbach’s alpha, which measures 
the reliability of a scale from 0 to 1, is 0.92 
for this scale. 
A second scale, also adapted from Kak-
abadse and Kakabadse (2001), measures the 
perceived impacts of privatization on the re-
sponding manager. The scale is constructed 
by summing a manager’s assessments (rang-
ing from 1 to 5) of 7 impacts of privatization 
on employees, including workload, morale, 
motivation, productivity, job satisfaction, job 
security, and job success. Lower scores in-
dicate negative impacts, and higher scores 
indicate positive impacts. The lowest possible 
score is 7, and the highest possible score is 35. 
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale is 0.85.
Professional Identity
Three measures operationalize professional 
identity. These measures are based on an 
agency manager’s agreement or disagree-
ment on a 1 to 5 Likert-type scale with the 
following statements: (1) My work should 
be primarily technical rather than manag-
ing consultants; (2) Professional reputation 
is more important to me than rank; and 
(3) I identify myself as a professional more 
so than a public servant. The fi rst measure 
seeks to tap an agency manager’s preference 
for technical tasks over contractor manage-
ment, an orientation expected among pro-
fessionals in highly privatized settings (Kettl 
1993). In this study, such technical tasks are 
thought to pertain mostly to design engineer-
ing, which characterizes the lion’s share of 
the study sample. The second measure pits 
professional reputation against rank, repre-
senting different sources of organizational 
prestige in professional and civil service per-
sonnel systems, respectively (Henry 2004). 
The third measure pits professional identity 
against public service identity, given the po-
tential for professionals to espouse loyalty to 
their profession over loyalty to public service 
(Wilbern 1954).
Beliefs about Privatization’s Impacts
on Professional Self-Interest
Privatization’s impact on professional self-
interest is measured using a scale that sums 
a survey respondent’s level of agreement or 
disagreement (1 to 5 scale) with the follow-
ing statements: (1) Employees who manage 
consultants are more quickly promoted than 
those who do not manage consultants; (2) Ex-
perience in managing consultants is necessary 
for advancement at this agency; (3) Consul-
tant management experience is a good skill 
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to have; and (4) Consultant management ex-
perience enhances my attractiveness to other 
employers. These statements were developed 
based on interviews with agency employees 
indicating their belief that consultant man-
agement experience provided opportunities 
for advancement within the agency, as well 
as skills marketable to the private sector. The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.74.
Relationships between 
Public Managers and Contractors
Relational distance, defi ned by Black (1976) 
as the degree to which people participate in 
one another’s lives, is operationalized in six 
individual measures. A manager’s experience 
with privatization is measured using three 
variables: the percentage of time currently de-
voted to managing consultants, the number of 
years devoted to working with consultants at 
the agency, and the number of years working 
with consultants elsewhere. The time length 
of relationships and experience is a common 
measure of relational distance, which has 
been correlated with more positive percep-
tions held by regulators of regulated entities 
(Hood et al. 1999; Grabosky and Braithwaite 
1986; Simpson 1977). 
A fourth measure of relational distance 
is the frequency of interactions between the 
manager and consultants taking place out-
side the agency setting. Survey respondents 
were asked to indicate the frequency (from 0 
= never to 4 = frequently) with which they in-
teracted with consultants in 10 settings: pro-
fessional organization meetings, the agency’s 
consultant relations advisory group, training 
sessions, alumni groups, service organizations, 
civic groups, sports clubs, youth groups, re-
ligious organizations, and social events. The 
higher the scale score, the more interaction 
takes place between the manager and con-
sultants outside the agency. These items are 
based on ideas outlined in the social network 
literature (see Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
The Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is 0.87. 
 A fi fth measure of relational distance is a re-
spondent’s private-sector experience, which is 
used to capture the shared-experience dimen-
sion of relational distance (Hood et al. 1999; 
Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986). Brudney, 
Hebert, and Wright (1999) also used private-
sector experience (although not as a relational 
distance measure) to predict support for gov-
ernment reinvention reforms. Private-sec-
tor experience is measured using a dummy 
variable indicating whether (1) or not (0) the 
respondent has worked in the private sector 
on transportation-related issues. 
The fi nal measure of relational distance is 
a scale that gauges the quality of manager-
contractor relationships. The scale,  adapted 
from Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2001), sums 
managers’ assessments of relationships with 
contractors, ranging from 1 for the most nega-
tive version of the characteristic to 5 for the 
most positive version of the characteristic. Ten 
items are assessed: formality versus informal-
ity, fl exibility versus infl exibility, distance ver-
sus friendship, closed versus open, disrespect 
versus respect, outsider versus partner, adver-
sarial versus cooperative, declining versus im-
proving, all business versus social, and distant 
versus involved. Thus total scores can range 
from 10 to 50. Higher scores on the scale 
indicate more positive relationships. Cron-
bach’s alpha for the scale is 0.90. 
Control Variables
Control variables include gender, level of edu-
cation (0 = GED, 1 = high school diploma, 2 
= some college education, 3 = associate’s de-
gree, 4 = undergraduate degree, 5 = graduate 
degree); length of time that the manager has 
worked at the agency (to control for those 
respondents who have witnessed increased 
privatization at the agency over time); and the 
percentage of a respondent’s projects involving 
consultants (to account for the level of privati-
zation experienced by the respondent).
Results
Because the study’s dependent variables are 
ordinal—representing positive to negative im-
pacts of privatization—the modeling process 
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uses ordered probit regression. As opposed to 
linear regression modeling, which assumes a 
continuously distributed dependent variable, 
ordered probit modeling is appropriate for 
analyzing variables that have two or more 
categorical outcomes that can be ordered but 
for which the distances between categories 
is unknown (Long 1997, 114). Ordered pro-
bit is a nonlinear regression model that is an 
extension of logistic regression (Long 1997, 
7). Two models are estimated: the perceived 
impacts of privatization on the agency and 
the perceived impacts of privatization on the 
respondent. 
In the model of privatization’s perceived 
agency impacts (Table 1), more positive con-
sultant relationships and experience work-
ing with consultants outside the agency are 
both associated with favorable perceptions of 
privatization’s impacts on the agency (both p 
< 0.01). These results are consistent with the 
hypotheses. However, higher percentages of 
respondent time devoted to consultant man-
agement correspond with more negative per-
ceptions of privatization’s agency impacts (p 
< 0.05), a result that contradicts expectations. 
Of the three professional identity measures, 
only a manager’s preference for technical 
work over consultant management is associat-
ed with negative perceptions of privatization’s 
agency impacts (p < 0.01). The length of a 
respondent’s tenure at GDOT and the per-
centage of a respondent’s projects involving 
consultants are signifi cant positive infl uences 
on privatization perceptions (p < 0.05 and p < 
0.10, respectively). McKelvey and Zavoina’s 
R2, which most closely approximates the or-
dinary least squares R2 statistic for ordinal 
outcomes (Scott and Freese 2003, 163), is 
0.39 for this model. 
The second ordered probit model, of man-
agerial perceptions of privatization’s personal 
impacts, yields similar results to the fi rst mod-
el, with a few exceptions (Table 2). As in the 
fi rst model, positive contractor relationships 
and years working with contractors outside 
the agency are associated with more favorable 
perceptions of privatization’s personal impacts 
Table 1. Perceptions of Privatization’s Agency Impacts
Characteristic/Measure b za P > |z|
Professional Identity
Technical work/consultant management −0.43 –2.63 0.01
Reputation/rank −0.08 −0.47 0.64
Professional/public servant 0.06   0.45 0.66
Professional Self-Interest 0.06   1.53 0.13
Relational Distance
Percentage of time devoted to contractor management −0.01 −2.33 0.02
Years working with contractors within agency 0.00 −0.16 0.87 
Years working with contractors outside agency 0.06   2.87 0.00
Frequency of external interactions with contractors  0.01   0.36 0.72
Private-sector experience −0.15 −0.67 0.50
Contractor relationships  0.08   3.67 0.00
Control Variables
Gender 0.62   1.41 0.16
Education −0.08 −0.77 0.44
Years working for GDOT  0.03   2.09 0.04
Percentage of respondents’ projects involving consultants 0.10   1.77 0.08
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 = 0.39. N = 118.
a Based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
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(p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). Again, 
the percentage of time a respondent devotes 
to consultant management is associated with 
more negative privatization perceptions (p 
< 0.05). However, two explanatory variables 
become marginally signifi cant that were in-
signifi cant in the fi rst model: the number of 
years working with consultants within the 
agency is associated with negative privatiza-
tion perceptions, and the frequency of exter-
nal interactions with consultants is associated 
with positive privatization perceptions (both p 
< 0.10). The remaining explanatory variables 
are insignifi cant infl uences on perceptions of 
privatization’s personal impacts. McKelvey 
and Zavoina’s R2 for this model is 0.34.
Discussion
Privatization studies have not focused on the 
perceptions of affected managers—a signifi -
cant knowledge gap given that reform efforts 
depend on managerial cooperation. This 
study takes a step toward fi lling that void by 
examining determinants of managerial per-
ceptions of privatization within the Georgia 
Department of Transportation. 
The expectation that managers with stron-
ger professional identity would have more 
negative perceptions of privatization arose 
from the classic conceptualization of pro-
fessionals as autonomous, operating within 
clear boundaries, and performing tasks for 
which they are trained (Mosher 1982). Nega-
tive reactions to privatization were expected 
based on the potential for contracting out 
to violate this autonomy, blur operational 
boundaries, and shift managers away from 
the work of their training and toward con-
tract management. The data provide mixed 
support for this expectation. When measured 
as a preference for technical work over con-
sultant management, professional identity is 
strongly correlated with negative perceptions 
of privatization’s agency—but not person-
al—impacts. (These differential results may 
indicate a stronger concern for the agency’s 
loss of technical capacity and a relative lack 
Table 2. Perceptions of Privatization’s Personal Impacts
Characteristic/Measure b za P > |z|
Professional Identity
Technical work/consultant management –0.19 –1.36 0.17
Reputation/rank 0.00 –0.01 0.99
Professional/public servant 0.11   0.75 0.45
Professional Self-Interest        
Relational Distance
Percentage of time devoted to contractor management –0.01 –1.96 0.05
Years working with contractors within agency –0.05 –1.69 0.09 
Years working with contractors outside agency 0.05   2.61 0.01
Frequency of external interactions with contractors  0.02   1.66 0.10
Private-sector experience –0.14 –0.70 0.48
Contractor relationships 0.08   4.66 0.00
Control Variables
Gender  0.30   0.90 0.37
Education 0.14   1.22 0.22
Years working for GDOT  0.02   1.44 0.15
Percentage of respondents’ projects involving consultants  0.03   0.53 0.60
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 = 0.34. N = 118.
a Based on White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
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of concern that privatization will pose ad-
verse career impacts.) Professional identity, 
when measured as a manager’s perception as a 
professional versus a public servant, does not 
correlate with privatization perceptions. Pro-
fessional identity also does not correlate with 
privatization perceptions when measured as 
the relative importance of professional repu-
tation over rank. Considered together, these 
results suggest that privatization contradicts 
professional identity only to the extent that 
professional work tasks are altered. Alter-
natively, it is possible that a preference for 
technical work over consultant management 
is less indicative of professional identity and 
more indicative of managerial preferences 
regarding daily work tasks. 
Public choice approaches that emphasize 
budget minimization led to the hypothesis 
that managers would perceive privatization 
positively to the extent that they believed 
privatization incurred professional benefi ts. 
The data indicate that managerial beliefs in 
privatization’s career benefi ts do not signifi -
cantly infl uence their perceptions of privati-
zation. The results contradict public choice 
predictions that self-interest determines bu-
reaucratic support for reform proposals (Wade 
1979). As a consequence, there is little evi-
dence that managerial support for privatiza-
tion (in this setting, at least) can be bought 
with emoluments. 
Based on regulatory capture theory (Hood 
et al. 1999; Ashworth, Boyne, and Walker 
2002; Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986), stron-
ger relationships between managers and con-
sultants (defi ned both in terms of quality and 
quantity of relationships) were expected to 
yield more positive privatization perceptions. 
The results indicate that better relationships 
between managers and contractors lead to 
more favorable privatization perceptions; 
however, more time spent managing contrac-
tors is associated with negative perceptions 
of privatization’s impacts. More experience 
with contractors outside GDOT correlates 
with more favorable privatization percep-
tions, while more experience with contractors 
within the agency only infl uences (in a nega-
tive direction) perceptions of privatization’s 
personal impacts. More frequent external 
interactions with consultants correlate with 
more favorable perceptions of privatization’s 
personal impacts but not its agency impacts. 
Finally, as Brudney, Hebert, and Wright 
(1999) found, a manager’s experience in the 
private sector does not appear to infl uence 
privatization perceptions. 
Several factors may account for these seem-
ingly contradictory results. First, the percent-
age of time spent managing consultants may 
refl ect the nature of managerial tasks more so 
than relational distances to contractors. If so, 
consultant management time may be similar 
to the preference for technical work over con-
sultant management: both are associated with 
negative perceptions of privatization because 
they gauge a desire for different daily work 
activities. It is also possible that consultants 
who perform poorly require more manage-
rial time, leading these time-burdened man-
agers to have more negative perceptions of 
privatization’s impacts. 
Second, private-sector experience does not 
infl uence privatization perceptions, but exter-
nal experience with consultants does (in a pos-
itive direction), suggesting that prior exposure 
to consultant practices in other settings—not 
exposure to market values—infl uences posi-
tive perceptions of privatization’s impacts. 
But why does experience with GDOT con-
sultants translate into negative perceptions 
of privatization’s personal impacts? And why 
do agency tenure and a higher percentage 
of consultant projects (both control vari-
ables) correlate with positive perceptions of 
privatization’s agency impacts? Perhaps these 
seeming contradictions signal an acknowl-
edgement by more seasoned GDOT manag-
ers that, while consultants are valuable con-
tributors to agency operations, the agency’s 
increased use of consultants has undesirably 
altered their job content and career paths. 
The context of this study is highly spe-
cifi c, featuring a state transportation agency 
dominated by civil engineers. However, the 
239Vol. 37, No. 3, 2005
Managerial Perceptions of Privatization
results may provide lessons to state and lo-
cal agencies in which privatization’s primary 
implementers are professionals who are asked 
to contract for professional services. Consider 
the areas of state government highlighted by 
the General Accounting Offi ce for signifi cant 
privatization activity (1997, 23). Of these ar-
eas, personnel with masters’ and doctoral de-
grees are found among health, mental health, 
education, and social welfare agencies. There 
may be similar patterns of mixed perceptions 
among professionals in public service in re-
gard to the infl uence of outsourcing on the 
performance of their organizations. In this 
way, the fi ndings refl ect those of other public 
professionals (Osborne 2000; Singer 2003). 
Conclusion
The broader implications of this study de-
pend on one’s view of privatization. Those 
who believe that privatization threatens the 
integrity of public service (Frederickson 1997; 
Haque 2001) may happily conclude that man-
agers appear not to base their perceptions 
of privatization on expected career benefi ts. 
Thus, managers’ feelings about privatization 
(in this setting, at least) are not “bought” by 
career perquisites. On the other hand, those 
espousing this perspective may warn that 
public managers can be “captured” by con-
tractors, much in the same way that regula-
tors are captured by their regulated commu-
nities. If manager-contractor relationships 
color managerial views of privatization, then 
perhaps positive contractor relationships will 
also lead managers to increasingly contract 
out, even when doing so may not be cost ef-
fective or appropriate. 
Those who believe that privatization paves 
the path to better government (Savas 2000) 
may view these study results as information 
for improving managerial acceptance of priva-
tization. The implications of this study may 
be couched as advice to public executives, e.g., 
“build relationships between consultants and 
managers” and “be prepared for some manag-
ers to resist the shift from ‘rowing’ to ‘steer-
ing.’” From this perspective, one strategy for 
overcoming this resistance is to wait: as career 
civil servants retire, a new generation of public 
managers will be trained to know nothing of 
“rowing,” only of “steering.” Thus the resis-
tance problem will resolve itself over time.
Regardless of whether one embraces its 
promises or sounds its warnings, privatiza-
tion is a reality that affects public employ-
ees. Lower morale, reduced motivation, and 
impaired job satisfaction arising from the 
change in job responsibilities from agency 
production to consultant oversight are among 
the effects suggested by this study. At a min-
imum, managers should be aware of these 
human resource impacts and perhaps even 
seek to strike a balance in assigning employ-
ees consultant management and production 
responsibilities. 
Much research is needed to continue this 
line of inquiry. Longitudinal data on privati-
zation’s impacts on managerial career trajec-
tories is one such topic. The relationship be-
tween managerial perceptions of privatization 
and implementation effectiveness is another. 
Regardless of the approach, scholars should 
note privatization’s impacts on the human 
fabric of public organizations—beyond cost 
savings and the mechanics of contractual ar-
rangements—to achieve a fuller understand-
ing of the consequences of the increasingly 
“hollow” state. 
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Note
 1. State departments of transportation use the term 
consultant to denote deliverers of professional ser-
vices, including preconstruction engineering (With-
eford 1999). The terms consultant and contractor are 
used interchangeably in this article.
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